T-799 P006/015 F-035 RECEIVED CENTRAL FAX CENTER

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#### IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

First Named Inventor: Lane W. Lee

Application No. 09/939,960 Filing Date: 08/27/2001

For: Mastering Process and System For

Secure Content

Examiner: Firmin Backer

Art Unit: 3621

Attorney Docket No.: M-12043 US

### **APPELLANTS' AMENDED OPENING BRIEF**

### Real Party In Interest

The real party in interest is DPHI Acquisitions, Inc., the present assignee of US Application No. 09/939,960.

### Related Appeals and Interferences

There are no other appeals or interferences which will directly affect or be directly affected by or have a bearing on the Board's decision in the pending appeal.

#### Status of Claims

Claims 1 - 36 and 42 - 43 are cancelled.

Claims 37 – 41 are pending and are twice rejected by the non-final Office Action dated April 19, 2005.

The rejection of claims 37 - 41 is appealed.

#### Status of Amendments

Claims 37 – 43 were finally rejected on December 8, 2004. In response, an amendment was filed March 8, 2005 and entered by the Examiner. An additional amendment canceling claims 42 and 43 is presented concurrently with this appeal brief and has not yet been entered by the Examiner.

#### **Summary of Claimed Subject Matter**

The present invention relates to digital rights management (DRM). In conventional DRM systems, the host (such as a PC) is where the DRM processing is conducted. This location is inherently vulnerable to hacking. Thus there is a need for improved DRM systems. However, content users have legitimate expectations as well that should not be violated by an overly-restrictive DRM system. To address this need in the art, Applicants have provided a DRM system in which DRM "intelligence" is incorporated into the storage engine such as a CD-ROM drive, magnetic hard drive, etc. As opposed to conventional DRM systems that reside on the host, an integrated storage engine approach is far less vulnerable to hacking by a host system user -- the user has no access to DRM functionality within the storage engine other than through reading and writing of secure content according to rules governed by the storage engine itself. The user knows that digital content may flow to and from the data storage medium but cannot access the "how" within the storage engine that enabled such movement. Moreover, the integration of the DRM system into the storage engine is advantageous in portable applications. Different host systems such as kiosks at a content provider retail outlet or a personal computer may be more readily modified to couple to the portable DRM-system-integrated storage engine.

Regardless of where the DRM functionality is integrated (host or storage engine), an integral part of DRM systems involves the right of the content provider to revoke access privileges of content users. In conventional DRM schemes, the revocation is "all or nothing" in that after authentication of a user, the user's identity is checked for revocation. If the user is indicated as revoked, no file access is granted. In addition to their storage-engine-DRM-implementation described above, Applicants have improved upon this all-ornothing revocation scheme. In addition to making a global revocation decision at the time of authentication, a revocation decision may be made later on a file-by-file basis. In other words, a user may be revoked as to file A but not as to file B. This improved "granularity" to the revocation process gives greater control and flexibility to the DRM implementation.

Aspects of this DRM-system-integrated storage engine with a granular fileby-file revocation scheme may be seen in Applicants' Figure 6 and the accompanying description on pages 29 and 30 and are set forth in Applicants' independent claim 37. For example, a host seeking access to content (or wishing to write content) on a storage medium 602 controlled by storage engine 604 first provides a certificate 610 to become authenticated. This is reflected in claim 37 through the acts of "receiving at a storage engine a certificate from the host device, the certificate containing a digital signature," and "authenticating the digital signature." (see Applicants' Figure 6 and the accompanying description on pages 29 and 30). Before being authenticated, the host will be checked for revocation using revocation list 608. As described for example, on page 45 through 78 of the specification and reflected in the acts of "receiving at the storage engine a file request from the authenticated host device, the file request being directed to a file stored on a storage medium accessible to the storage engine; within the storage engine, reading security metadata associated with the file from the storage medium, the security metadata containing at least one rule governing access to the file; within the storage engine, applying the at least one rule to the file request from the host device; and if the application of the at least one rule provides a failing result, denying the file request," the storage engine may read security metadata from the storage medium to provide "functionality to the CKDRM and TPDRM methods, including lock/unlock, CKDRM play, [and] CKDRM copy permissions." (page 46, lines 5-6). Thus, a user may wish access to a certain file but be denied (revoked) as to this file because, for example, it remains locked, or the user does not have play permission, etc.

## Grounds of Rejection to Be Reviewed on Appeal

1) Whether, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), claims 37 – 41 are anticipated by U.S. Patent Publication No. 2002/0174073 to Nordman, et al.

### Argument

1). Claims 37 through 40 are plainly not anticipated by the Nordman publication.

Claim 37 is directed to a content access method incorporating the storageengine and granular revocation features discussed in the summary section.

Specifically, claim 37 includes the acts of "receiving at a storage engine a
certificate from the host device, the certificate containing a digital signature;
authenticating the digital signature; [and] receiving at the storage engine a file
request from the authenticated host device, the file request being directed to a
file stored on a storage medium accessible to the storage engine." In response
to this file request, the storage engine performs the acts of "reading security
metadata associated with the file from the storage medium, the security
metadata containing at least one rule governing access to the file, within the
storage engine, applying the at least one rule to the file request from the host
device; and if the application of the at least one rule provides a failing result,
denying the file request."

The Nordman reference (2002/0174073) stands in sharp contrast. Rather than have a granular, file-by-file revocation scheme as discussed with regard to claim 37, the Nordman reference discloses the usual "all or nothing" revocation scheme. In particular, as seen in his Figure 1, Nordman is directed to the protection of privacy for a cell phone/wireless device 110. Through configuration of "profile operators" 115, the cell phone user may develop several privacy profiles depending upon the scenario. A number of examples are described starting at paragraph 198. For example, a shopping scenario is described in paragraph 200, a meeting scenario in paragraphs 202 -203, etc. But note the glaring deficiency in each of these scenarios with regard to the method recited in claim 37. The "host" in each instance does not seek a file from the handset and then get denied. Instead, upon authentication, the host may have access to any file the user has authorized access to in that particular scenario. There is no granularity whatsoever, just the conventional "all or nothing" approach with regard to any particular authenticated host. For example, in the "meeting"

scenario" of paragraphs 202-203, a user decides what information to provide such as "personal information, software including games, etc., documents, and so forth." (paragraph 203). If another in this meeting scenario is authenticated, that authenticated user then has access to this information. Nordman has not a shred of suggestion or teaching for attaching rules to the files in the meeting scenario. In other words, if another is authenticated, that authenticated other has rights to whatever has been authorized in this scenario. As such, this "revocation" is no different than any other conventional DRM revocation scheme: if upon authentication, a host is not revoked, that host has access to whatever files the authentication is directed to: there is no granularity (file-by-file) revocation in Nordman whatsoever. In sum, Nordman does not teach or suggest (let alone anticipate) the acts of "within the storage engine, applying the at least one rule to the file request from the host device; and if the application of the at least one rule provides a failing result, denying the file request."

Moreover, the lack of a file-by-file revocation scheme is not the only flaw in the Nordman reference. The Nordman privacy scheme is "host-based" in that it requires a profile operator (element 115) to manage the user's profile information (paragraph 47). As such, there is no data-storage-engine-based act of "within the storage engine, reading security metadata associated with the file from the storage medium" by the user device 110 in Nordman. Instead, a host (the profile operator) determines whether another can access a user's profile information in Nordman. As discussed above, host-based DRM schemes are inherently less secure than Applicants' storage-engine-based DRM implementation.

Accordingly, claim 37 and its dependent claims 38 – 41 are patentable over the cited prior art.

Therefore, in light of the foregoing arguments, Applicants respectfully request the Honorable Board of Appeals to reverse the decision of the Examiner with respect to claims 37 through 41.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: March 22, 2006

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#### Claims Appendix

37.. An access method, comprising:

receiving at a storage engine a certificate from the host device, the certificate containing a digital signature;

authenticating the digital signature;

receiving at the storage engine a file request from the authenticated host device, the file request being directed to a file stored on a storage medium accessible to the storage engine;

within the storage engine, reading security metadata associated with the file from the storage medium, the security metadata containing at least one rule governing access to the file;

within the storage engine, applying the at least one rule to the file request from the host device; and

if the application of the at least one rule provides a failing result, denying the file request.

- 38. (previously presented) The method of claim 37, wherein the at least one rule comprises a plurality of rules.
- 39. The method of claim 37, wherein the storage medium is an optical disk.
- 40. The method of claim 37, wherein the application of the at least one rule act comprises checking play privileges for the host device.
- 41. The method of claim 37, further comprising: if the application of the at least one rule provides a successful result, granting the file request.

## Evidence Appendix

No evidence was submitted under Rules 130, 131, or 132.

# Related Proceedings Appendix

There are no related proceedings.